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FEMINIST JUDGMENTS AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS AT
WORK
Gillian Thomas*
The history of the law’s treatment of working women is largely a history of the
law’s treatment of women’s bodies. Overwhelmingly created by male judges, that
jurisprudence considers women from a remove—their physicality, their
reproductive capacity, their stature, their sexuality—eclipsing meaningful
consideration of their lived experience, on or off the job. As vividly illustrated by
1
so many of the alternative rulings contained in Feminist Judgments, that erasure
resulted in Supreme Court decisions that—even when they came out the “right” way,
that is, in favor of the female litigant—squandered opportunities for advancing sex
equality.
The tantalizing notion of “what might have been” is much of the pleasure in
reading this collection, of course. But the book’s overarching thought experiment
also offers invaluable lessons to today’s practitioners, myself included, who must
tell clients’ stories. Long before we get the opportunity to tell those stories to
2
juries—itself an increasingly rare occurrence —we must tell those stories to judges
who themselves may be years, even decades, away from “real” jobs, and who have
remained isolated from the realities of working women’s lives.
Women’s capacity for pregnancy always has been the primary driver of their
inequality, especially on the job. As Feminist Judgments makes plain, it is that
physical fact—or more accurately, that physical difference from male bodies—that
has preoccupied legislatures, employers, and the Court and has impeded women’s
full status as workers. The “special treatment” approach to women’s reproductive
capacity has cut both ways, neither of them advantageous to women. The 1908
3
decision in Muller v. Oregon, in which the Court upheld a state law limiting the
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1 FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
(Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger & Bridget J. Crawford eds., 2016) [hereinafter FEMINIST
JUDGMENTS].
2 See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122
YALE L.J. 522 (2012).
3 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
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number of hours women could work in laundries or factories to ten hours a day,
epitomizes this catch-22. As Andrea Doneff’s introductory remarks explain,
legislation limiting women’s hours was intended by pro-labor forces as an “entering
wedge” in the fight for humane working conditions, which had been dealt a blow
4
three years earlier in Lochner v. New York, when the Court invalidated a similar,
5
gender-neutral law governing bakery employees. But the reasoning employed by
the Court to uphold Oregon’s statute rested not on consideration of women’s
freedom to contract, or a finding that the distinct dangers of laundry work warranted
6
special regulation, both of which principles underpinned the result in Lochner.
Rather, the Muller Court relied on society’s collective purported interest in
protecting female laborers’ wombs: “[A]s healthy mothers are essential to vigorous
offspring,” opined the Court, “the physical well-being of woman becomes an object
7
of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race.”
The imaginary dissent written by Pamela Laufer-Ukeles takes the majority to
task for ignoring the extent to which, for large swaths of female workers, the
8
“benefit” accorded by the Oregon law actually posed a significant “burden.”
Specifically:
While the individual who would benefit immediately if my dissent became law
is the male employer who can be said to be taking advantage of working women
by employing them for an exorbitant number of hours, the majority opinion hurts
all women in the long run by demeaning them in the eyes of the law and impeding
the momentum of the law and history towards recognizing women’s intellectual
9
equality and significant ability to contribute to the work force.

Moreover, she observes, the statute did nothing to assist the women who
needed such safety regulations most—namely, women who were actually pregnant,
10
rather than merely potentially so. (In this way, Laufer-Ukeles foreshadows the
11
contemporary finding by the Court in Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. that,
under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act employers must “accommodate” pregnant
workers needing job modifications on the same basis as they do other workers
12
“similar in their ability or inability to work.” ) And even more fundamentally,
writes Laufer-Ukeles, by embracing a women-only approach to occupational health,
the majority missed an opportunity to situate women within a universalized approach
to work and well-being that would have avoided the benefit-burden conundrum
altogether:

4 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
5 Andrea Doneff, Commentary on Muller v. Oregon, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note
1, at 78, 80.
6 198 U.S. at 64.
7 208 U.S. at 421. Of course, it is plain to which race the Court was referring; the law’s
centuries-long indifference to the toll of the brutal labor extracted from women of color speaks for
itself.
8 Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Rewritten Opinion in Muller v. Oregon, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS,
supra note 1, at 83, 91–93.
9 Id. at 96.
10 Id. at 92.
11 Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
12 Id. at 1359 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)).
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[B]oth men and women are vulnerable and need protection at various times in
their lives . . . . [M]en and women both become ill, suffer from overwork and
stress, suffer from loss and physical and emotional challenges over their
lifetimes . . . . [R]ecogniz[ing] and protect[ing] against such vulnerabilities is
constitutionally justified by the state for the purpose of protecting its citizens’
13
health and well-being and is certainly not arbitrary.

Where Muller failed in assuming that only women needed “protection” from
toxic workplaces—and that among women, all anticipated becoming mothers—the
14
Court’s decision nearly seventy years later in Geduldig v. Aiello failed for the
opposite reason: it assumed that the male body was the baseline for measuring equal
treatment under California’s temporary disability benefits program. It further
evinced willful blindness to the very real incapacity posed by childbirth, and the very
real economic harm effected by excluding new mothers from the program. As the
Court infamously concluded, the California scheme passed muster because “[t]here
is no risk from which men are protected and women are not,” and “there is no risk
15
from which women are protected and men are not.”
One can only draw the
conclusion that Muller’s singling pregnancy out for “protection” paved the way for
Geduldig’s singling it out for detriment. Under either frame, it is sui generis, a
“plus” factor to be added to or subtracted from any given regulatory scheme.
Indeed, as Maya Manian observes, what should have mattered was “the effect
16
of pregnancy exclusions,” not merely “the risks covered.” Lucinda Finley’s altopinion rights this schematic wrong. “The question whether the exclusion of
pregnancy-related disabilities leaves women similarly situated to men cannot be
17
answered by facile resort to the uniqueness of pregnancy,” she writes. “It must be
answered solely with reference to the purpose of the program, not to the nature of
18
the underlying risk or cause of the temporary disability.” (That program, in the
California legislature’s words, was “to compensate in part for the wage loss
sustained by individuals unemployed because of sickness or injury and to reduce to
19
a minimum the suffering caused by unemployment resulting therefrom” —criteria
plainly qualifying those recovering from childbirth.) Finley goes on to situate the
exclusion of pregnancy benefits within historical context: “An equality doctrine that
implicitly says that women can claim equality only insofar as they are just like men
is an impoverished concept of equality, unable to protect women from the
disadvantages they have long suffered because of sex role stereotypes often based
20
on their biological, reproductive ‘uniqueness.’”
Stereotypes, Finley contends, also underpinned the state’s insistence that
covering pregnancy leaves would be too expensive—namely, the stereotypes that,

13 Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 8, at 95–96.
14 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
15 Id. at 496−97.
16 Maya Manian, Commentary on Geduldig v. Aiello, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note
1, at 185, 188.
17 Lucinda M. Finley, Rewritten Opinion in Geduldig v. Aiello, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS,
supra note 1, at 190, 196.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 192 (quoting CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 2601 (West 2018)).
20 Finley, supra note 17, at 198.
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on the spectrum of physical impairments, childbirth is distinctly debilitating, and on
the spectrum of beneficiaries of the program, new mothers were especially prone to
21
abuse its benefits. “The exclusion reflects the idea that women are mothers first,
22
and workers second,” she explains. “This ideological belief assumes that most
23
women will, and should, leave the workforce when they have children.” Rather,
the economic reality for most working women—and indeed, for the four original
plaintiffs in the case, all of whom were the sole or primary breadwinners in their
households—supported, rather than undermined, their rightful inclusion in the
California program.
The perniciousness of sex stereotypes, and their power to shape employers’
notions of who is an ideal worker, were on full display in the Court’s 1977 decision
24
in Dothard v. Rawlinson. On the one hand, the Court’s ruling was a progressive
one in that it rejected Alabama’s height and weight thresholds for prison guards,
which in combination posed an insurmountable barrier to most female applicants;
the state, concluded the justices, had adduced no evidence to show that those
thresholds, and their disparate impact on women, were justified by “business
necessity,” in that there were no data reflecting that bigger prison guards made better
25
prison guards. Yet, maddeningly, when the Court turned to consideration of the
state Board of Corrections’ ban on women serving in maximum security prisons that
put them in direct contact with inmates, it ignored the ample factual record put
forward by Kim Rawlinson’s attorneys—which confirmed that women around the
country were succeeding in maximum security facilities—and found Alabama’s rule
was justified by Title VII’s bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)
26
exception.
Despite recognizing that the statute banned “stereotyped
characterizations of the sexes,” the Court nevertheless resorted to just such
preconceptions about male inmates’ propensity for sexual assault in finding women
27
per se unqualified to be correctional officers.
In her concurring and dissenting opinion, Maria Ontiveros calls out the
28
majority for its paternalism. The Court has, she observes, decided for women what
risks they may assume. Indeed, by accepting the assumption that female guards are
more susceptible to sexual assault than male guards are to physical assault generally,
the Court constructs a no-win proposition: the woman’s very body poses a risk. (As
Judson Locke, the Commissioner of the Board of Corrections, had put it in his
29
deposition, “[The female guard] is a sex object.” ) In addition to “reinforc[ing] the
subordination of women, in general, and of female workers in particular,” says
Ontiveros, the Court’s analysis is further infected by twin blind spots: racism—in

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Id. at 205–06.
Id. at 206.
Id.
433 U.S. 321 (1977).
Id. at 328–31.
See id. at 336–37.
Id. at 333, 335–36.
Maria L. Ontiveros, Rewritten Opinion in Dothard v. Rawlinson, in FEMINIST
JUDGMENTS, supra note 1, at 213, 213–27.
29 Brief for the Appellees at 53, Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (No. 76-422),
1977 WL 189473, at *53 (brief filed sub nom. Dothard v. Mieth).
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deeming the “jungle-like” environment of Alabama prisons singularly unfit for
women—and ignorance, in framing sexual assault as a crime of passion, not
30
violence.
As satisfying as Ontiveros’s methodical puncturing of the majority’s BFOQ
decision is, however, I found myself even more compelled by her critique of its
business necessity analysis with respect to the disparate impact claim. While
applauding the majority for concluding that Alabama had failed to produce any
evidence that height and weight correlated with the state’s stated job criterion of
“strength,” Ontiveros’s imagined concurrence goes one step further: Who decided
that “strength” made a better prison guard, anyway? That criterion was itself based
on a stereotype, and its resulting disparate impact demanded further probing inquiry.
Ontiveros further questions the extent to which the carceral state has deformed the
qualifications deemed a “necessity” to the “business” of running a prison:
In this case . . . the employer has chosen to operate its prison with inadequate
staffing and facilities. It has chosen not to classify or segregate its population by
type of offense or level of dangerousness . . . . It has also designed prisons in a
dormitory style and incorporated extensive farming operations that it argues
31
require a large number of strip searches.

Indeed, Ontiveros notes, employers make all sorts of choices that dictate what
makes the “ideal worker,” among them, the standards of performance that it will
32
reward and the structure of its workplace operations, like scheduling procedures.
As a glimpse at the top ranks of virtually any field will tell you, that worker is a man.
It is deep dives like this one that make Feminist Judgments such a rewarding
endeavor. The gendered nature of work is a Jenga-like construct of assumptions,
stereotypes, and anachronistic traditions. It is built on notions of what jobs women’s
bodies are capable of, and judgments about what they are not. Reimagining how the
Court could have, and should have, untangled these puzzles reminds us that our best
legal arguments arise from asking “why?”—or better yet, “why not?”—and
answering those questions with our clients’ stories.
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Ontiveros, supra note 28, at 223.
Id. at 217.
Id. at 216–17.

